In this conversation with Susan C. Stokes, Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor and Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy, we spoke about her new book, ‘The Backsliders: Why Leaders Undermine Their Own Democracies.’
We also explored the global phenomenon of democratic erosion and examined why some countries have proven more vulnerable to institutional challenges than others. Stokes discussed her research on how economic factors and political polarization contribute to democratic backsliding, and shared insights on the role that various actors—from journalists to voters—can play in strengthening democratic institutions.
Lecturer bio:
Susan Stokes is the Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor and Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy.
Her research interests include democratic theory and how democracy functions in developing societies; distributive politics; and comparative political behavior. Dr. Stokes’ articles have appeared in journals such as the American Political Science Review, World Politics, and the Latin American Research Review. She teaches courses on political development, political parties and democracy, comparative political behavior, and distributive politics.
Her single and co-authored books include Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America (2001), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (2013), Why Bother? Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests (2019), and The Backsliders: Why Leaders Undermine Their Own Democracies (2025).
She is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Transcript:
Seth Green: Welcome all! We are here for our conversation on The Backsliders: Why Leaders Undermine Their Own Democracies, and we are joined by the author of this book, Susan Stokes, who is the Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor here at the University of Chicago, and very relevantly, the Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy. My name is Seth Green, and on an afternoon like this one, I’m especially grateful to say I’m the Dean here at the Graham School at the University of Chicago. Welcome to our gorgeous campus, which is every bit this beautiful today.
And welcome to the Graham School, where for more than 130 years, we have been the leader of rigorous, lifelong learning, extending the incredible assets of this university to individuals across all ages and stages of life.
I’ll just mention that we have a number of other upcoming events in the days ahead. Tomorrow, we’ll be doing a preview of our upcoming class with Anapnip on Moby Dick. Next week, we’ll be hearing from Tom Cole and his new book, Doing Meritocracy Right. And then, right after the Thanksgiving holiday, we will be back with a conversation about the return journey for those who may be in midlife and looking to return to work. How do you thrive after a career break?
I will also just mention that we have our holiday party now less than a month away, and we have over 500 people that have RSVP’d, so you should join them and be part of our phenomenal intellectual community. It will be from 5 to 7, and beforehand, we will have a conversation with Chris Jones. Chris is actually bringing a Graham School group this week to Broadway to look at the business of Broadway, and he will be back from that trip and we’ll be talking with him about what he learned and his thoughts on the future of theater.
And then finally, I just want to mention that at our holiday party, we have our Excellence in Teaching Awards, and we are thrilled this year to be celebrating four incredible instructors—two for Innovation in Teaching, Douglas Post and Jacqueline Victor, and two with the Dean’s Service Award, which I’m particularly fond of, Elliot Crick and David Ray, for what have been decades of service to our students.
But you are here today to hear from the one and only Susan Stokes. Susan has let me know that she had something come up, and so she is in transit, but did not want to miss this. And so, apologies—you may hear a tiny bit of background noise, but I’m sure her genius will shine through.
And so, Susan, to get started, a very simple question: Why did you write this book? And the follow-up, just to preview it, is why now? Why this book, and why at this moment in time?
Susan Stokes: Thank you so much, Seth, and I’m really grateful for everyone who’s here, your interest in this topic, and I’m very grateful for your forbearance with my strange location. You will see random people walking behind me here and there, but my attention is entirely yours.
I, you know, when I was a graduate student, it was a time of great excitement where, in many world regions, there was a really dramatic wave of democratization. So, actually, before I was a graduate student, in Southern Europe there were several countries—Portugal, Spain, Greece—that had transitions to democracy. And then Latin America, which is the area that I studied in the 80s and 90s, one after another dictatorship fell, and it was a very exciting time with transitions to democracy.
Of course, that was then followed by transitions to the fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. So that was sort of the story—the big story—of regime change in that period. And, you know, democracies sort of struggle along, and things don’t always work that well, and it’s not as though getting rid of dictatorships means achieving the good society. But nevertheless, you had competitive elections, relatively free association, informed citizenries, and military establishments that were confined to the barracks and were loyal to the Constitution.
And then, in the late—very tip end of the 20th century—we began to see a shift toward what we call democratic backsliding. It wasn’t a return to coup d’état; it was a new kind of phenomenon, where elected leaders were undermining their own democracies. That was of great concern, especially for someone who studied Latin America.
And then, of course, we had an election in this country in 2016, in which we elected someone who appeared to be less than reverential of democratic institutions. That was very surprising—to me and to many colleagues in the social sciences. So that was the reason why I became interested in trying to understand why this is happening, and what the origins and causes of democratic backsliding around the world were.
Seth Green: Well, so, let’s talk about your book. You mentioned the late 20th century, and that’s a period during which globalization is really taking root. And it’s also leading to what have been, since then, significant bifurcations and growth in inequality in many industrialized countries.
And in your book, you argue that that is fertile ground for democratic backsliding. Can you walk us through how economic grievances may translate into support for leaders who attack democratic institutions?
Susan Stokes: Yes, absolutely, and you’re absolutely right, Seth. A lot of my book is dedicated to explaining the connection—the multiple connections—between income inequality and wealth inequality on one side, and democratic backsliding on the other.
An original discovery that I, along with my colleague Eli Rao, made—through statistical analysis—is that the key structural factor that increases a democracy’s probability of experiencing democratic backsliding is high levels of income or wealth inequality.
So, having found that sort of statistical regularity, it was important to piece together the connective tissue: What is it about societies becoming more unequal, or being highly unequal, that leads democracy to fray?
There are basically two ideological types of leaders who carry out democratic backsliding:
- One type is right-wing ethno-nationalists—mostly in the Global North.
- The other is left-wing populists—mostly in the Global South.
Focusing first on the Global North: There were changes that go back to the postwar decades, changes in society and economy that meant that traditional left-of-center parties—Social Democrats, Labor Party, the Democratic Party in the U.S.—shifted away from being the parties of the working class and began to appeal more to affluent, college-educated, urban voters.
At the same time, traditional conservative parties remained tied to a small regulatory state and light social guarantees. Those shifts opened up space for new political parties that voiced more support for social spending and resisted globalization.
They began to adopt positions that were very strongly ethno-national—defining a “true people” of the nation and framing others as internal enemies. That’s the birth of right-wing ethno-nationalism in the Global North.
Income inequality under globalization left big swaths of low-income, working-class populations somewhat orphaned in the system—open to the appeals of right-wing ethno-nationalist parties that played on a sense of grievance and being left behind. And when those parties achieved power, they often attempted to undermine their democracies.
Seth Green: When… I know your book looks at the right-wing ethno-nationalist and also the left-wing populist. Your point is that there are certain things in common, despite massive ideological differences.
Maybe I can just ask, Susan—you know, I understand how this creates the circumstances in which individuals are going to feel angry and want change. But why do you think what you write in the book—our “left-behind voters”—gravitate toward this approach and are open to this backsliding?
Susan Stokes: Well, I think the other major actors in the party system have given up on those kinds of positions—that’s part of the answer. Among right-wing ethno-nationalists, a strong populist appeal can be heard. In the Global South, it’s left populists making that same appeal.
And then there are other effects of income inequality—such as partisan polarization and loss of confidence in institutions—that make people turn and say, “Okay, which party is talking about how these elitist institutions aren’t on my side?” They find a ready home in right-wing ethno-nationalist parties.
Seth Green: Well, economics plays a huge role—and I know we’ll continue that in the Q&A—but are there other global or technological shifts beyond economic inequality that have enabled this moment?
Because your book looks at how, over the beginning of the 21st century, more than two dozen presidents and prime ministers have attacked their countries’ democratic institutions. So this is a wave—what else is enabling it?
Susan Stokes: The other really important factor is not economic but political—a kind of demonstration effect among leaders.
So, Viktor Orbán in Hungary comes to power, becomes an illiberal leader, and undertakes a national gerrymander. Then Donald Trump looks over and says, “Gee, I’d like one of those for myself.” A few years later, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil is inspired by Trump and undertakes similar actions.
There’s a contagion effect. But what’s interesting are the non-factors.
For instance, the age of a democracy—how long it’s lasted—doesn’t turn out to be a strong predictor of backsliding. In the past, for military coups, key predictors were income per capita and age of democracy. But with backsliding, those don’t hold up.
Backsliding and coups are two different animals, with different actors and aspirations. Income per capita makes only a marginal difference, and the age of democracy plays no role.
Seth Green: And those things, Susan, I assume, would make it lower — the higher income.
Susan Stokes: Exactly.
Seth Green: The longer you’ve been in democracy, you’re less likely to have a coup.
Susan Stokes: Exactly. One finding is that any country with an income per capita over about $4,000 a year is very unlikely to experience a military coup. Once a country has gone six years without a coup, it’s no more likely to have one, other things being equal, than a country that’s never had one — kind of like remission after cancer.
So those were our expectations going in. But coups and backsliding are very different animals — they have different actors and motives. Income per capita makes a little difference at the margins, but it’s not a robust result. It comes and goes depending on the model. And the age of the democracy doesn’t play a role.
Seth Green: Building on your point about military coups, your book notes that you can have coups that abruptly end a democracy — which remain rare — and then leaders who gradually undermine democratic institutions while maintaining popular support. How do they maintain that strength even as they undermine democracy?
Susan Stokes: Great question. What’s not happening is a widespread rejection of democracy. People don’t wake up deciding they want another system. What does happen is tied to inequality — loss of confidence in institutions and polarization.
In polarized societies, it’s easier for people to excuse attacks on the press or courts because they fear the other side more. They think, “I may not like this, but I can’t let the other side win.”
Another part of the story — and one of the original arguments of my book — is about strategy. Take Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil: he called his opponents communists and said it was too bad the military didn’t kill 30,000 people. That’s extreme polarizing rhetoric. It strengthens support among his base, but risks backlash.
So another strategy these leaders use is what I call “trash-talking democracy.” They don’t say democracy is bad; they say their country’s institutions are corrupt and elitist. They tell followers not to worry about attacks on courts or elections, because those institutions were already rotten. And then they promise to rebuild them — more dependent on the executive.
Seth Green: And for people who feel democracy isn’t working for them, that might sound like an improvement — a chance to rebuild a broken system. Kathy Cohn’s Ryerson Lecture made me think of this: marginalized groups often see revolution, not voting, as the way to create change. So it’s less about ideology and more about powerlessness. How do countries come out of this? What helps reverse backsliding?
Susan Stokes: With humility, we’re still in the middle of this drama. But some patterns emerge. Some backsliding leaders exit office — sometimes voted out, sometimes forced out. Others become full autocrats — like in Venezuela, Nicaragua, maybe Turkey.
In Mexico and Ecuador, term limits eventually forced out backsliding leaders. Bolsonaro in Brazil lost re-election, tried to hold on, but ultimately left and has faced legal consequences. In Poland, the ruling party lost an election. Sometimes leaders are ousted by their own parties when they become liabilities — as in South Africa, or the near-miss in the UK under Boris Johnson.
Opposition groups can also slow things down — using parliamentary rules or local resistance to stall autocratic reforms.
Most importantly, backsliding isn’t inevitable. These leaders never have full support. They make big mistakes — often because they surround themselves with yes-men. Those mistakes create openings for pro-democracy actors.
Seth Green: Let me play devil’s advocate. Some argue that what looks like backsliding is actually an attempt to make democracy more representative — unraveling rigid systems created by elites to block majority will. How do you distinguish between reform and erosion?
Susan Stokes: Excellent question. Similar arguments are made by leaders across the spectrum — for example, by Mexico’s left-wing president. But democracy is built on both vertical and horizontal accountability — responsiveness to voters, and checks from other institutions.
When reforms concentrate power in the executive or weaken independent institutions, that’s a red flag. Real reform would strengthen professionalism and neutrality — not impose loyalty tests.
In Mexico, President López Obrador tried to undermine the independent national election body, one of the best in the world. When the court stopped him, he went after the court — and now the judiciary is elected in a way that ties it to the ruling party. That’s not reform; that’s consolidation of power.
Seth Green: Right. And as James Robinson’s Why Nations Fail shows, consistent rule of law and stable institutions drive prosperity.
There are questions in the chat about inequality. One asks: if even the poor now afford things the rich once couldn’t — TVs, cars, air conditioning — why does income inequality matter so much? And another asks about perceived versus actual inequality.
Susan Stokes: Great question. What counts as basic needs changes over time — housing, transportation, dignity. But inequality matters psychologically and materially.
Psychologically, when people feel their standard of living is falling or mobility is gone, they’re prone to blame others for jumping the line — a message populists exploit.
But inequality also shapes the views of people at the top. As Seymour Martin Lipset argued, elites justify vast inequality by dehumanizing those below — which erodes democratic empathy.
And finally, market dynamics can amplify this: profits accumulate at the top, creating affordability crises for everyone else — especially in housing.
Seth Green: And it changes how we deploy talent and resources. Today the top 10% account for a majority of consumer spending. So the economy follows their preferences — from highways with fast lanes for a fee to two-tiered Disney Worlds.
Susan Stokes: Exactly. Inequality shapes the whole system — even our public spaces.
Seth Green: Another question: what role does social media play in shaping trust and challenging norms?
Susan Stokes: The shift from a few high-quality news sources to a fragmented media landscape — cable TV, then social media — has increased polarization and misinformation. Algorithms keep people in silos.
That said, research suggests democratic erosion predates social media. It’s not the sole cause, though it amplifies polarization and distrust.
Seth Green: Nick asks: many authoritarian leaders claim to represent the disadvantaged but serve the advantaged. Do the disadvantaged ever turn against them?
Susan Stokes: Sometimes. Right-wing ethno-nationalists often provide more social spending than traditional conservatives — though not always. In the U.S., populist rhetoric hides elite-friendly policies. In India, Modi has expanded welfare programs effectively.
It’s complex. Left-wing populists tend to reduce inequality; right-wing ones use welfare selectively, balancing rhetoric and control.
Seth Green: Jerry asks about education. Are some leaders backsliding out of ignorance? What’s the role of civic education?
Susan Stokes: Education is crucial. At UChicago, we teach a “Democratic Erosion” course shared by 150 campuses. Civic and critical education helps people understand democracy’s strengths and limits.
College-educated voters are less likely to believe conspiracy theories like the 2020 election fraud claims. Education builds resilience against misinformation.
Seth Green: Final question from Candace: if you were advising pro-democracy strategists heading into elections, what would you recommend?
Susan Stokes: Don’t choose between defending democracy and addressing economic issues — do both. Reducing inequality and supporting the vulnerable strengthens democracy itself. Investing in social welfare isn’t just good policy; it’s democracy protection.
Seth Green: Susan, thank you for this conversation. We all feel deeper in our understanding because of your work and clarity.
Susan Stokes: Thank you so much, and thanks to everyone for coming.
Seth Green: Thank you again, and safe travels!
